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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses recent research into the economic impact of AIDS in 
South Africa.  It focuses on demographic and macroeconomic modelling and 
on firm-level impact studies.  While the overall picture is murky, certain 
trends and findings are indicative of a likely increase in inequality.  
Relatively skilled workers could benefit from greater employment, higher 
wages, a larger supply of products produced for their niche markets, and may 
also live longer as it becomes economically viable for firms to provide anti-
retroviral medication.  The relatively unskilled and unemployed will 
probably experience declining income, falling consumer welfare, and suffer 
greater morbidity and mortality from AIDS.  The size of the pie may shrink 
as a result of AIDS, but employed people – and especially the skilled 
amongst them – will enjoy a growing share.   
 
 
Introduction 
 
How is the AIDS pandemic affecting growth and distribution in South 
Africa?  The short answer is:  it’s impossible to say – the data simply isn’t 
available.  At best, there are several (sometimes contradictory) fragments of 
information which, when fitted together, perhaps provide some indication of 
the broad picture.  The main sources of information are these: 
1) two demographic models which project the path of the epidemic 
based primarily on ante-natal survey data, mortality figures and 
assumptions about sexual behaviour in the population; 
2) three macro-economic projections of the impact of AIDS on 
economic growth, employment, etc.; and   
3) an uneven but growing body of research on the impact of AIDS on 
firms, household and economic sectors.   
This paper discusses the three research areas and draws tentative 
implications for the likely impact of AIDS on growth in general, and on 
distribution in particular.  It is not a comprehensive bibliographic review (as 
in CADRE 2000a and 2000b), but rather a more selective and discursive 
analysis of important and recent pieces of research.  
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The Demographics 
 
Of all the available fragments of information, the two1 main demographic 
models (ASSA 20002 and Metropolitan3) are the most consistent.  Both 
models assume that the HIV epidemic moves through the population via 
sexual interaction between four  risk groups (ranging from high-risk groups 
such as commercial sex workers, to those with no risk of HIV infection).  
Projections of the epidemic differ depending on assumptions and input 
parameters (e.g. probabilities of infection, fertility rates, median term to 
death, mother-to-child transmission rates etc.).  Both the ASSA 2000 and 
Metropolitan models are calibrated to fit the ante-natal survey data, but the 
ASSA 2000 model (which is also calibrated to fit the latest (1999/2000) 
mortality data released by the Department of Home Affairs), is widely 
regarded as the more sophisticated of the two.       
Both models predict that the South African population will grow by a 
mere 1,5 million between 2000 and 2015 (i.e. 10 million fewer than would 
have been the case in a no-AIDS scenario) and that the labour force will 
remain almost stagnant over the next fourteen years.  ASSA 2000 predicts 
that HIV prevalence will grow from its current level of 11%, and will peak at 
16,2% in 2006 (i.e. 7,7 million people).  The number of people with full-
blown AIDS is predicted to rise five-fold to 880 000 in 2005, and then to 1,2 
million people in 2015.  AIDS-related deaths follow the trend for full-blown 
AIDS with a two-year lag.     
Peak prevalence occurs between the ages of 20 and 45 for men, and 15 
and 30 for women.  The demographic models use data showing a higher HIV 
prevalence for women than for men.  There is some evidence that there is 
little difference in HIV prevalence between men and women who are 
employed (Dorrington, 2001).  This suggests that unemployed women are 
particularly vulnerable to HIV infection.  HIV prevalence rates amongst the 
unemployed are typically 30-50% higher than among the employed – 
reflecting in part the large share of young people (and females) amongst the 
unemployed (BER, 2000:7).  
                                                          
1 There are other models as well – such as that of Abt/Metropolitan and ING-Barings 
– but these are typically variants of the ASSA or Metropolitan models. 
 
2 The ASSA 2000 model was developed by the Actuarial Society of South Africa 
(originally as an extension of the Doyle Metropolitan model).  
 
3 This model was developed by Peter Doyle and is propriety to Metropolitan Life (a 
large insurer in South Africa).   
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Prevalence also appears to vary between skill levels (see Table 1 below).  
Drawing on insurance data and other private sector information, Dorrington 
(2001) reports that those in the higher job grades have an HIV prevalence of 
only 2,5% to 3%.  This information was used in the ASSA 2000 model to fit 
the epidemic curves for white and Asian people (who tend to be concentrated 
in the higher job grades) rather than the ante-natal survey data (which is 
unreliable for higher income groups4).   The ASSA 2000 model predicts that 
HIV prevalence will peak at 3,2% (2011) for whites, at 4,8% (2010) for 
Asians, at 6% (2010) for coloureds and at 19,5% (2006) for Africans.    
One of the problems with the demographic models for economic analysis 
is the difficulty involved in teasing out the impact of race from other 
variables such as skills and income.  As noted above, the ASSA 2000 model 
used information on HIV prevalence by skill to project epidemic curves for 
whites and Asians.  However, for Africans and coloureds, researchers have 
had to move from information about race to assumptions about skill 
prevalence.  The Metropolitan and ING-Barings models derive HIV skills 
profiles by ‘overlaying’ the 1996 census data on occupation with age, gender 
and racial HIV profiles per province (see ING-Barings, 2000: 7).  This 
results in a far higher estimate for HIV prevalence amongst skilled workers 
in 2000 (7,2% for highly-skilled workers, to 12,1% for skilled workers and 
14,3% for unskilled workers) than is assumed in the ASSA 2000 model 
(reported in BER, 2001: 7).   
These highly varying estimates of prevalence by skill level are a problem 
for macroeconomic models because of the profound impact of skills 
shortages on economic growth.  As can be seen in Table 1, unemployment 
amongst the highly skilled is already very low.  According to an ILO study, 
more than 60% of firms in 2000 reported that they would have problems 
replacing skilled labour (2000: 5).  The point at which the economy ‘runs 
out’ of skilled labour has major implications for the projected 
macroeconomic impact of AIDS.  According to the Metropolitan model, 
1.4% of highly skilled workers will have full-blown AIDS by 2005, this 
estimate rising to 3.5% in 2015 (Abt/Metropolitan, 2000).  Given that less 
than 1% of the highly skilled are unemployed, there will not be nearly 
enough people to replace those dying of AIDS in these categories.  
Therefore, unless firms react by providing their skilled workers with life-
prolonging anti-retroviral medication, the economy will be constrained by 
skills shortages and skilled wage pressure (as described in BER, 2001).  This 
constraint will kick in later if the ASSA estimates are closer to the mark.     
                                                          
4 The ante-natal survey data is taken from women attending government-run clinics.  
Higher-income people tend to visit private sector facilities and hence will not be 
adequately represented in the ante-natal survey.  
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Table 1.  The Structure of South Africa’s Labour Force 
(1996 Census Data) 
 
 Highly Skilled*** Skilled** Semi & Unskilled* 
Economically active       Number % Number % Number %
Formally employed 1,300,009 92.1 2,899,334 76.5 3,509,890 40.9 
Informally 
employed 
100,177 7.1 289,901 7.7 710,223 8.3 
Unemployed 11,148 0.8 598,083 15.8 4,366,238 50.8 
Total labour force 1,411,334 100 3,787,318 100 8,586,351 100 
    
Composition (%) 10.2% 27.5% 62.3% 
HIV prevalence in 
2005 (2015)# 
13.3% 
(18.3%) 
20.2% 
(25.4%) 
22.8%  
(27.6%) 
AIDS prevalence in 
2005 (2015)# 
1.4% 
(3.5%) 
1.9% 
(4.2%) 
2.2%   
(4.7%) 
***Highly-skilled (professional, semi-professional and technical occupations, 
managerial, administrative and executive occupations) 
** Skilled (clerical services and sales occupations, farmers, farm managers, artisans, 
apprentices and related occupations, production foreman, production advisor) 
* Semi- and unskilled (all occupations not defined as highly-skilled or skilled) 
# Data from Abt/Metropolitan  
Source:  BER, 2001: 11, 12. 
 
 
The close association between unemployment and poverty has been well 
established (Leibbrandt et al; 2000, Seekings, 2000).  A recent household 
survey in the Free State indicates that AIDS-affected households are in a 
particularly vulnerable position as they have higher rates of unemployment 
and are more dependent on non-employment income like pensions (Booysen 
et al, 2001b).  This suggests that one or more of the following is the case:  
people living in households with limited (if any) access to wage employment 
are more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infection;  that AIDS-affected households 
have experienced disproportional employment losses because of AIDS; and 
that people living with AIDS migrate to households with pensioners in order 
to be taken care of.    
What does this mean for overall inequality?  All else being equal, 
households which lose a breadwinner through AIDS will fall further down 
the income distribution.  If the job is taken by a previously unemployed 
person, then that person’s household will move up the income distribution.  
The overall Gini coefficient will thus remain broadly unchanged.  However, 
if firms react by cutting back on the number of jobs, then the number of 
households without access to a breadwinner will rise, thus worsening the 
Gini coefficient.  If average wages rise at the same time (perhaps in response 
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to increased pressure from workers to compensate them for the burden of 
higher medical insurance and health expenditure, or perhaps because the 
average worker is becoming more skilled as firms get rid of unskilled 
workers first) then inequality will worsen further.    
At this point the importance of economic modelling becomes clear.  
Questions like ‘What is the likely impact of AIDS on labour demand and 
income?’ need to be answered before anything can be said about the impact 
of AIDS on income distribution.  But the issue goes beyond the ‘partial 
equilibrium’ impact of labour demand and wages.  We need to know how the 
impact of AIDS on firms (and the government) feeds through the entire 
macroeconomy to impact on the level of national income.  This means 
tracing the likely impact on the level and composition of demand, on 
investment, on economic structure (as some sectors benefit or lose more than 
others) and on the level and composition of government spending.   
Any discussion of the impact on distribution requires information about 
the size of the pie (the GDP) and the number of people in need of a slice (the 
population).  AIDS slows income growth – but it also slows population 
growth.  If the population falls faster than income, then per capita income 
will rise.  But while this is theoretically possible, it is not common.  
Econometric research indicates that AIDS has either had an insignificant 
impact on the growth of per capita income in developing countries (Bloom, 
1997) or has reduced it (Bonnel, 2000).  Bonnel’s results indicate that ‘in the 
case of a typical sub-Saharan country with a prevalence rate of 20 percent’, 
the growth rate of per capita income would be reduced by 1.2 percentage 
points a year because of AIDS (2000: 846).  But whether absolute per capita 
income is higher or lower as a result of AIDS in any particular country is 
ultimately an empirical question.       
As shown below, two of the three South African models predict a rise in 
per capita income, whereas the third predicts a fall.5  Whether per capita 
income rises or falls has disturbing ethical and policy implications.  The 
Malthusian possibility that AIDS may increase per capita income might 
suggest to those policy-makers with no respect for human life that AIDS may 
be in some sense ‘welfare-enhancing’.  They may conclude that it is 
economically rational to do little to prevent the AIDS epidemic from taking 
its course.  Leaving aside the moral and ethical problems of such a position, 
it does point, at minimum, to the importance of producing the best possible 
                                                          
5 Abt Associates (2000: 49-50) also conclude that AIDS is likely to increase per 
capita incomes – although they do so not on the basis of their own macroeconomic 
model, but rather by reviewing modelling work from the rest of Africa and modifying 
it to take into account factors specific to South Africa (such as high unemployment).  
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macroeconomic modelling work - and showing how different assumptions 
and theoretical underpinnings produce different results.   
Modelling the Macroeconomic Impact of AIDS  
 
The earliest attempts to model the economic impact of AIDS in South Africa 
were those of Broomberg et al (1991) and Trotter (1993).  They adopted a 
‘human capital’ approach which summed up both the expected direct costs of 
AIDS (i.e. health costs) as well as indirect costs (discounted lost future 
earnings) over time.  However this approach is not suitable for examining the 
full macroeconomic impact of AIDS,  because it does not trace through the 
repercussions of these costs on consumption, investment and savings – and 
thus ultimately on the pattern and rate of growth.   
Macroeconomic modellers take the demographic projections and try to 
estimate how the impact of AIDS will affect the economy.   This entails a 
three-step process.  First, they use an existing macroeconomic model to 
project what growth would look like in the absence of AIDS.  Then they 
hypothesise a set of presumed ‘channels’ through which the epidemic is 
assumed to affect the macroeconomy.  Finally, they estimate (and 
guesstimate) the size of these various channel effects, plug the assumption 
into the model and see what growth path results.  This growth ‘with AIDS’ 
scenario is then contrasted with the ‘growth without AIDS’ scenario.  
The model projections depend in the first instance on the nature and 
design of the macroeconomic model.  The first big modelling exercise (ING-
Barings, 2000) used time series information together with a ‘social 
accounting matrix’ (SAM) that provided more detailed household-level data.  
Arndt and Lewis (2000) made use of the same SAM, but in the context of a 
more neoclassical ‘computational general equilibrium’ (CGE) model.  The 
most recent macroeconomic modelling exercise – that of the Bureau for 
Economic Research (BER, 2001) at Stellenbosch – does not use a SAM, but 
instead builds on their Keynesian framework (using insights from available 
research, including that by ING-Barings).    
There are many ‘channels’ through which the AIDS pandemic can affect 
the macroeconomy.  AIDS has an immediate (or ‘first order’) impact on the 
size (and efficiency) of the labour force.  But while demographic models can 
provide a broad indication of the impact on the size of the labour force, the 
impact on the efficiency of the labour force is much harder to estimate.  
There is very little reliable data on the distribution of HIV prevalence across 
skill bands – or between the employed and unemployed parts of the labour 
force. 
The other first-order impact of AIDS is on patterns of consumption (i.e. it 
is usually expected that more household resources will be allocated to health 
care).  Although there is an emerging body of household-level research (e.g. 
Booysen et al 2001b), there is as yet no information that can be generalised 
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to the national level.  International research in developing countries is 
suggestive, but often contradictory.  For example, there is research showing 
that households may erode savings by paying for the health costs of AIDS 
sufferers, and increase savings by supporting surviving household members 
(see Ainsworth & Over, 1994; and CADRE, 2000a).  Given that HIV 
infection is concentrated amongst poorer South Africans, it is unlikely that 
savings will increase as a result of AIDS.  Indeed, Booysen et al (2001) find 
that AIDS-affected households draw on available savings to finance medical 
costs and funerals.  However, there is as yet no information about the impact 
of AIDS on total household savings.  
Research in Africa indicates that AIDS-affected households shift 
spending away from durable goods towards non-durables like food (ILO, 
2000: 5-7; Abt Associates, 2000: 52).  This does not, however, mean that the 
overall pattern of demand will change in this direction.  Firstly, AIDS-
affected households could spend relatively less on durables and absolutely 
less on non-durables like food (as was the case in the Booysen et al (2001) 
study).  In such a scenario, the demand for both durables and non-durables 
will fall.   
Secondly, the overall impact on the pattern of consumption is mediated 
by the distribution of AIDS-affected households across the income 
distribution (and by differential consumption patterns across income 
brackets).   For example, the ING-Barings model assumes that AIDS will 
result in a greater share of income going to richer households (as skilled 
wages rise in response to skilled labour shortages).  Data in the SAM used by 
ING-Barings indicates that richer households spend more on services and 
durable goods than do poorer households.  Thus as skilled workers rise up 
the income distribution, the model predicts that this will cushion the impact 
of lower demand for durable goods from AIDS-affected households.  
CADRE argues that this is ‘at odds with research elsewhere which suggests 
that households cut back on durable consumption to maintain food intake’ 
(2000b: 14). In this regard, however, CADRE misses the point that the 
overall impact on demand is a function not only of changes in expenditure 
patterns at the level of the individual household, but also a function of the 
allocation of income between households.    
The ING-Barings model uses demographic data on the expected size of 
the labour force and then ‘weights’ it to account for different skill 
composition (i.e. skilled labour carries a higher weight) and adjusts it 
downwards to account for loss of productivity as a result of AIDS.6  This has 
been criticised by CADRE (2000b: 14) on the grounds that it probably 
                                                          
6 ING-Barings assumes that ‘for every person with full-blown AIDS, four months of 
person year equivalent labour supply will be lost’ (2000: 11). 
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underestimates the productivity contribution of experienced workers in 
lower-skill categories (and hence the impact of replacing such workers) and 
the potential for high-skill capacity bottlenecks in some sectors.  But in the 
absence of better information, macroeconomic modelling work is often 
forced to make such blanket assumptions.  
AIDS also affects people indirectly – i.e. through the impact of ‘second-
order’ effects which occur after firms and the government have responded to 
the first-order impact of AIDS.  These are even more difficult to estimate.  
Does one assume that firms will respond to higher medical costs for 
employees and lower productivity by replacing labour with machinery – and 
if so, by how much and in which sectors?  Will firms respond to higher 
(direct and indirect) labour costs by raising prices (i.e. passing costs on to 
consumers) or reducing profits (thereby probably reducing investment in 
subsequent periods)? To what extent will they share the costs with workers – 
thereby reducing take-home pay, consequently lowering consumer demand, 
and thus dampening growth in subsequent periods?  The different models 
assume different scenarios and model the way in which the assumptions 
impact on economic growth in different ways.7   
There are similar problems regarding the reaction of government to the 
AIDS pandemic.  Will government increase spending on health – and if so, 
will this be at the cost of lower spending on other items; and if so which?  
There are very different implications for growth in the long run, depending 
on where spending is cut – whether on education or the military.  
Alternatively, one could assume that the government responds by increasing 
borrowing or taxation to finance the increase in health spending.  Depending 
on the nature of the macro model, such increases have further knock-on 
effects.  In more Keynesian models (like ING-Barings and BER) deficit-
financed health spending increases demand and growth, whereas in the CGE 
model of Arndt and Lewis (which assumes full-employment), increased 
borrowing reduces private investment and hence constrains growth over 
time.      
Both the ING-Barings and BER models predict a slight worsening of the 
ratio of budget deficit to GDP as government faces the dual pressure of 
                                                          
7 Employers shoulder two-thirds of the higher medical cost burden in the ING-
Barings model, and half in the BER model.  Both assume that half of this burden is 
subsequently passed onto consumers.  As regards the indirect effect of AIDS on firms 
(i.e. lower productivity, increased turnover, recruitment costs etc.) the BER model 
assumes that productivity of infected workers is reduced by 40% (thus lowering the 
effective labour supply) and that this burden is shared between firms and consumers 
(BER, 2000: 23).  ING-Barings assumes no such additional reduction in the effective 
labour supply – hence the differences in projected trends for the labour force growth 
in the models (see Table 2). 
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depressed tax revenues and increased demand for spending on health.  They 
assume that the government will continue on the path of fiscal discipline and 
not engage in excessive borrowing or inflationary forms of financing the 
deficit.   However the BER model assumes greater wage pressure as a result 
of AIDS (driven primarily by skilled-labour shortages) and assumes that the 
Reserve Bank responds to such inflationary forces by pushing up interest 
rates.    
Despite these differences, the ING-Barings and BER models arrive at 
broadly similar findings with regard to GDP and employment (see Table 2).  
They both estimate that AIDS will reduce the growth rate of GDP by 0.6 
percentage points per annum.  As AIDS is assumed to reduce population 
growth by more than it reduces GDP growth, both models predict an increase 
in per capita income (of just under 1 percentage point per annum).  A similar 
logic underpins the prediction in both models that the rate of unemployment 
will fall as a result of the AIDS pandemic (employment falls, but because the 
labour force falls faster, the proportion of those without work decreases 
relative to that which would have occurred in a no-AIDS scenario).    
 
 
Table 2:  Percentage Point Differences between the AIDS 
and No-AIDS Scenarios in the ING-Barings (2000) and 
Bureau for Economic Research (2001) Macroeconomic 
Models 
 
 ING-Barings 
(2000) 
BER 
(2001) 
Impact of AIDS on: 2002-2015 2002-2015 
Real GDP growth p.a. –0.6 –0.5 
Real Gross Domestic Fixed Investment growth p.a.   0.0 –1.2 
Real Private Consumption growth p.a.  –0.7 –0.3 
Total population growth p.a.** –1.5 –1.3 
Total labour force growth p.a.*** –1.2 –1.6 
Employment growth p.a.**** –0.6 –0.6 
Growth in the unemployment rate (i.e. % of labour 
force without formal jobs)* 
–0.9 –2.0 
Real per capita GDP growth p.a.# 0.9 0.9 
Interest rate (% point difference in the level) 0.6 2.9 
Budget Deficit/GDP (% point difference in the level) 0.7 0.2 
* Figures for BER estimated from level data in (2001: 38).   
** Figures for ING-Barings calculated from data in (2000: 6). 
*** Figures for ING-Barings calculated from data in (2000: 10).  NB data for ING-
Barings is a labour force figure weighted by skill-level. 
**** Employment figure for ING-Barings estimated from data in (2000: 2). 
# Figures for ING-Barings calculated from data in the table.` 
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Despite similarities in the overall growth impact, the BER and ING-Barings 
models tell different stories as to why growth is constrained by AIDS.  
Whereas the ING-Barings model assumes that lower labour supply and lower 
labour productivity will induce firms to invest in capital (thus preventing 
investment demand from falling in the aggregate),8 the BER model assumes 
that investment will be limited by shortages of skilled workers (needed to 
operate the capital equipment) and by reduced profitability.  ING-Barings 
tells the story of a ‘vicious cycle’ in which reduced household income 
translates into lower consumption spending – which translates into lower 
demand and hence lower growth and household income.   
By contrast, the BER model assumes that there will be a strong upward 
pressure on skilled wages (as skills shortages intensify and as workers resist 
the erosion of their take-home pay due to rising costs of medical insurance).  
The BER modellers assume that the increase in wages will exceed any 
decrease in employment – and thus that wage increases will boost household 
income in the aggregate (although by implication it will be more 
concentrated in the hands of those households which still have employed 
members).  Neither model provides an explicit projection for income 
distribution – although both predict that the share of income going to higher-
income households will rise over time (ING-Barings, 2000: 14; BER, 2001: 
31-2).  But at the same time, the models predict that average living standards 
(i.e per capita income) will rise relative to a no-AIDS scenario and that one 
of the central determinants of poverty – unemployment – will fall.       
The macroeconomic model of Arndt and Lewis (2000) contains different 
assumptions and arrives at different conclusions.  They assume a far greater 
negative impact on productivity and investment, and a far greater impact on 
government spending and interest rates.9   Largely as a result of this, they 
project a much greater impact on GDP growth – i.e. growth is reduced by an 
average of about two percentage points a year between 2002 and 2010.  They 
attribute almost half (45%) the blame for this to the increase in the 
government deficit (which in their model ‘crowds out’ private investment) 
8 CADRE has criticized this aspect of the ING-Barings model, describing the induced 
investment response as ‘mechanistic’ and failing to take into account the possibility 
that lower growth will undermine investor confidence – and hence will reduce 
investment (2000b: 15-16). 
 
9 Arndt and Lewis assume that total factor productivity growth is reduced to one half 
of that in the non-AIDS scenario at the height of the epidemic.  This is an attempt to 
capture more fully the harmful economic impact of hiring, training, absenteeism, 
work-force disruption, slower technological adaptation etc (2000: 872-4).  
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and about a third (34%) of the blame to the negative impact of AIDS on total 
factor productivity growth (2000: 879-881).   This drop in growth is 
sufficiently large to exceed the drop in population – and hence per capita 
income in their model is projected to fall.  They conclude that per capita 
income in 2010 will be 8% lower than it would otherwise have been in the 
absence of the AIDS pandemic (2000: 877).  Arndt and Lewis show that if 
government-related AIDS expenditures and private expenditure on health 
and food is excluded, then per capita incomes decline by 13% (relative to the 
no-AIDS scenario).  They thus conclude that ‘the survivors of the AIDS 
epidemic are left with a smaller economic “pie” and more of this pie is 
directed towards non-discretionary health and food expenditures’ (2000: 
877).  
Also, unlike the BER and ING-Barings models, Arndt and Lewis predict 
that the unemployment rate amongst semi- and unskilled workers will rise 
and that the overall unemployment rate will remain broadly constant.  They 
argue that ‘while the unskilled labour pool is smaller, slower growth means 
that the demand for labour is correspondingly lower.  These two effects 
offset one another leaving the unemployment rate essentially unchanged’ 
(2000: 879). 
So where does this leave our understanding about the macroeconomic 
impact of AIDS?  In a rather confused state, to say the least.  The ING-
Barings and BER models come to similar conclusions about the likely 
impact on growth, unemployment and per capita income - but they do so via 
different economic channels.  The Arndt and Lewis model not only 
highlights a different set of economic dynamics, but concludes that the 
impact on growth will be more significant and that the final impact of AIDS 
on per capita income will be negative.  
Part of the problem lies in the different theoretical underpinnings of the 
macroeconomic models.   Macroeconomic modelling entails imposing a 
theoretical framework (in the form of a set of simultaneous equations) on a 
set of economic data, and then using the model to project forward in time (or 
to simulate the impact of economic shocks).  The key point is that very 
different theoretical models assuming different relations between economic 
variables can all generate a good ‘fit’ with the current (and historical) data - 
but produce very different predictions and results from simulations.  In the 
case of the three macroeconomic models discussed here, a key difference 
pertains to the way in which they model the economic impact of higher 
government expenditure.  As discussed above, the Arndt and Lewis model 
assumes that government borrowing crowds out private investment and 
lower growth over the longer term.  In the more Keynesian models of ING-
Barings and the BER, the increase in government spending is assumed to 
support growth by keeping consumption buoyant.  ING-Barings in fact 
argues that if the government maintains strict fiscal discipline in the face of 
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the AIDS pandemic (i.e. does not allow the deficit to rise as a proportion of 
the GDP) then this would serve to drain demand even faster out of the 
economy, thus dragging down GDP (and government revenues) in a 
‘downward spiral’ (2000: 22).  The Arndt and Lewis model, by contrast, 
assumes that such a downward spiral would not happen because private 
investment would increase. 
Such differences have major implications for government policy.  One 
theoretical approach implies that borrowing in order to finance increased 
health expenditure supports growth, the other implies the reverse.  And in the 
absence of any clear way of evaluating the different models, policymakers 
are left in a state of befuddlement over how to respond at the fiscal level.  
But differences between the models also arise as a result of the lack of 
adequate information about key behavioural coefficients in the models:  how 
much will total factor productivity fall and to what extent will the available 
pool of labour become less effective?  How will households realign their 
spending priorities in the face of AIDS? How much more expensive will 
labour become for firms? To what extent will they be able to pass on the 
higher costs in the form of price increases?  And will investment rise in 
response to incentives to become more capital-intensive, or will investors 
take their money out of the country?  Any macroeconomic modelling 
exercise has to make judgements about all of these choices – and in each 
case, the estimate could be wildly off track.  As Over (1992) showed ten 
years ago, modelling the macroeconomic impact of AIDS in Southern Africa 
is highly sensitive to assumptions about the prevalence of HIV across skill 
bands and the proportion of health expenditure that is financed out of 
savings.  This remains true today.  One must thus be very cautious about all 
macroeconomic models of the impact of AIDS.  At best, they help us think 
through the dynamic economic impact of AIDS.  At worst, they are a 
misleading and shaky house of cards.  
 
 
The Impact of AIDS on Firms 
 
There is a great need for more detailed research on the impact of AIDS on 
the investment, production, pricing and hiring decisions of firms.  AIDS 
affects firms through various channels including the demand for their output, 
efficiency losses on the production side and via changes in the social and 
legal environment.  Naidu (2001) provides a conceptual review of the ways 
in which AIDS affects the broader ‘macro market environment’ facing firms 
in South Africa.  This part of the paper concentrates primarily on the impact 
of AIDS on production, but also touches upon the possible impact of AIDS 
on demand patterns.   
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International research on the impact of AIDS on firms tends to draw a 
distinction between direct and indirect costs.10  Direct (or ‘out-of-pocket’) 
costs include pension and provident fund contributions, service bonuses, 
absenteeism and sick leave, death and funeral benefits, in-firm medical 
services, and the costs of recruiting and training replacement workers.  
Indirect or ‘unquantifiable’ costs include lower productivity of sick workers 
and the disruptive impact on teams and production processes.  The total 
impact on firms will vary depending on factors such as whether firms 
provide in-house medical facilities, the way in which employment benefits 
are structured, and the distribution of HIV+ people across the skill-
structure.11  
Until recently, there were no reliable studies of the impact of AIDS on 
firms in South Africa.  Press reports varied wildly and there was little clear 
understanding of how different estimates of productivity losses were arrived 
at (Michael, 2000; Abt Associates, 2000: 40-1).  Nevertheless,  research into 
the impact of AIDS on a sugar mill in KwaZulu Natal (Morris et al, 2000; 
Morris and Cheevers, 2000), and synthetic modelling work by Rosen et al 
(2000), are improving our understanding about the nature of the impact on 
firms in South Africa.  However, this kind of empirical work remains 
(inevitably) subjective – both in terms of estimating indirect costs and in 
terms of how direct costs are framed and quantified – and difficult to 
generalise across the entire economy.  Booysen and Molelekoa (2001) go 
some of the way towards rectifying this problem in their survey of firms in 
the Bloemfontein and Welkom areas.  But while this study has the advantage 
of pooling the results from twenty firms, the results cannot be generalised to 
the region (only 10% of surveyed firms responded, and most were small to 
medium-sized businesses) let alone to the whole of South Africa.  
The standard demographic assumption in South Africa appears to be that 
individuals who contract HIV live for an additional seven to ten years and 
that most of the debilitating illness and symptoms are manifest in the last two 
years of life.  The Natal sugar mill study found that in the two years prior to 
the men taking retirement (on grounds of ill-health), an average of 27.7 days 
were lost in each year (Morris et al, 2000: 940).  Of these, 11.7 days were 
accounted for by sick-leave, 5.4 days by hospitalisation, and 10.6 by visits to 
the clinic (assuming that each visit to the clinic during work hours resulted in 
half a day lost).    
Taking into account estimates for lost wages (due to lost days), the costs 
of hiring and training replacement workers (roughly doubled to proxy for 
                                                          
10 See Avetin and Huard (2000) for a clear exposition of this methodology as applied 
to three manufacturing firms in Cote d’Ivoire.  
11 See ILO, 2000: 13-18 for a discussion of the impact of AIDS on enterprises in 
Africa. 
 14
lost productivity due to disruption) and limited clinic and hospital-related 
costs, they estimated the cost of each HIV infection to be roughly three times 
the annual salary in each of the final two years of employment.  No 
adjustment was made for increased pension or medical aid costs, on the 
grounds that most (94%) of the HIV+ workers were in the lowest skill bands 
(Morris et al, 2000: 939).  These unskilled workers presumably did not have 
access to firm-based pension plans, and would have made use of government 
clinics rather than private medical facilities.12    
In their modelling work on the impact of AIDS on South African firms, 
Rosen et al assume that direct firm-based medical expenditure is low.  
Instead, they focus on pension benefits, service gratuities and death benefits 
for HIV+ workers, costs relating to sick leave and recruitment and training13 
of replacement workers.  These (present value of future) costs come to just 
under twice the annual salary of workers (see Table 3).   
 
Table 3: Rosen et al’s Present Value of the Future Costs of a 
New HIV Infection, assuming a Seven Year Interval between 
Infection and Death. 
 
Cost component Salary = 
R25,000 
Salary = 
R50,000 
Salary = 
R100,000 
Paid sick leave R5,741 R11,481 R22,961 
Pension benefits R38,487 R76,974 R15,947 
Recruitment /training R4,313 R4,313 R4,313 
Total R48,540 R92,767 R181,222 
Ratio of total costs to annual salary 1.94 1.86 1.81 
    
Savings (life extended by one year)* R4,412     
(9%) 
R8,433     
(9%)  
R16,475    
(9%) 
Savings (life extended by three years)* R12,071 
(12%) 
R23,070 
(12%) 
R45,067  
(12%) 
Savings (life extended by five years)* R18,400 
(38%) 
R35,166 
(38%) 
R68,697  
(38%) 
* Savings are reductions in the present value of future costs of a new HIV infection 
due to interventions that extend life by one, three or five years.  A discount rate of 
10% is used.  The figures in parentheses are total savings as a percentage of base-line 
costs.   
                                                          
12 Morris and Cheevers (2000) say that the relatively low proportion of costs 
attributable to health care (11%) is similar to that found in a study of six companies in 
Kenya (2000: 7).  Morris et al note that medical expenditure is not prominent in this 
population (i.e. the sugar mill) ‘because  of the public health system available’ (2000: 
943).  
 
13 They use data on recruitment and training from a five-firm study in Botswana. 
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Rosen et al use the model to show how medical interventions which increase 
life expectancy save firms money (by pushing costs further into the future - 
thus causing them to be discounted more heavily).  Their model shows that 
‘the present value of a new HIV infection would fall by 9% if employees’ 
average life expectancy could be extended for one year, by 25% for a three 
year extension and by 38% if five more years of productive life could be 
achieved’ (ibid: 303).  (This is simply because they are using a 10% discount 
rate).  The implication is that any treatment costing less than R4,412 that 
extends productive life by a year would be feasible for those on salaries of 
R25,000 or lower.  For higher-paid (skilled) workers, the upper limit of 
economically feasible treatment rises to R8,433 and R16,475.   
Booysen and Molelekoa (2001) adopt a similar methodology to estimate 
the impact of AIDS on the twenty firms they surveyed in Bloemfontein and 
Welkom.  Their figures were similar to those reported in Rosen et al (see 
Table 3).   Booysen and Molelekoa estimated present value of the cost per 
AIDS death was R44,319 for unskilled employees, R70,437 for skilled 
employees, and R190,877 for highly-skilled employees (2001: 15).  
However, the ratio of total costs to annual salary was more sensitive to skills 
level in the Booysen and Molelekoa study (1.35 for unskilled, 1.27 for 
skilled and 2.5 for the highly-skilled).   This appears to be because the 
information obtained from the survey allowed them to differentiate more 
clearly than Rosen et al between the different benefits provided for different 
skill levels.  They found that only a quarter of firms offered medical benefits 
(and in those cases, mostly to skilled workers (2001: 9)).   Booysen and 
Molelekoa conclude that the average savings to firms of extending 
productive life by one year is R5,491 per worker (20001: 16). 
Note that the estimates discussed so far only take only direct costs into 
account.  Once indirect costs and benefits are factored into the calculation, 
then the case for life-saving interventions becomes even more compelling for 
firms.    As Rosen et al explain:  
 
‘The financial benefits of pushing further into the future the 
types of costs analysed above are only a subset of the overall 
gains to a company of investing in keeping its workforce as 
healthy as possible for as long as possible.  By retaining 
skilled and experienced employees for an additional year or 
years, the company also:  
• buys time for drug prices to fall and for medical and 
social science researchers to  develop new ways to 
treat HIV/AIDS; 
• reduces the time managers must spend coping with 
employee deaths and high turnover;  
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• reduces the impact on the morale, motivation and 
concentration of the rest of its workforce of having 
colleagues fall sick and die; and  
• creates more time to implement strategies to cope 
with the epidemic, such as training replacement 
employees, shifting to less labour-intensive 
technologies, and managing the loss of overall 
workforce skill, experience, institutional memory and 
cohesion that HIV/AIDS is causing.’ (2000: 303). 
 
When Rosen et al did their study, the cost of antiretroviral (ARV) medication 
for a worker (i.e. over R36,000 a year) was between two and nine times 
higher than the (direct) benefits to business of providing such medication.  
However, since mid-2001, the cost of ARV medication has fallen so much, 
that Medicare (a medical aid company in South Africa) is now able to 
provide ARV medication and CD4 counts and blood tests for about R800 a 
month – i.e. about R9,600 a year (Regensberg, 2001).  If we assume the firm 
absorbs half these costs, then this will amount to R4,800 a year.  Assuming a 
discount rate of 10%, the present value of projected expenditure on ARVs 
over three years is R13,131 and over five years it is R20,016.  As indicated 
by the data in Table 4, this suggests that it will be cost-effective for firms to 
provide access to ARV medication to their more highly skilled personnel and 
that the cost (to the company) is only marginally higher than the benefits of 
extending the lives of less skilled workers for a year.  However, as discussed 
below, these results consider only the direct costs of AIDS.  Once indirect 
costs are included, the cost-effectiveness of providing ARV medication to 
workers becomes much more compelling.  
If, following the KwaZulu sugar mill study, we assume that the indirect 
cost of AIDS (i.e. on productivity, team-cohesion etc.) amounts to about 
50% of total (direct and indirect) economic costs, then we can double the 
Rosen et al estimates to include these factors.14  This will push the Rosen et 
al estimate for the lowest-paid workers up to R97,080 - and make it feasible 
to provide ARVs even to the low-skilled workers.  As can be seen from the 
figures in parentheses in Table 4, doubling the economic costs (as a rough 
proxy for including indirect costs) renders it economically feasible for firms 
to treat all workers with ARVs in order to prolong life and minimise 
disruption.   
This kind of exercise illustrates the important point not taken into account 
by macroeconomic modellers – i.e. that firms can react to minimise the 
impact of AIDS on their businesses.  As argued above, firms may chose to 
                                                          
14 This is consistent with research from East Africa showing high costs associated 
with disruption of production (ILO, 2000: 14). 
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provide ARVs to their skilled workers – and perhaps even to all workers – 
thereby extending the life of the workforce and minimising the disruptive 
impact on the labour market and patterns of consumption.  All three 
macroeconomic models discussed above assumed that providing ARV 
medication was out of the question.  While this is understandable with regard 
to the ING-Barings and Arndt and Lewis studies (because the cost of ARVs 
was still high in 2000), it is less understandable with respect to the BER 
study (as the costs of ARVs had fallen dramatically before the study was 
published).  If firms do react by providing ARVs (as is already being 
considered by Anglo-American) then all three macroeconomic models will 
have over-estimated the impact of AIDS on the workforce - the skills 
shortages, wages, consumption and medical costs – and thus overestimated 
the impact on growth and per capita incomes.    
 
 
Table 4: Net Savings to Firms as a Result of Providing 
Anti-retroviral Treatment to Workers (own calculations) 
 
 Additional 1 year Additional 3 years Additional 5 years 
Discounted 
cost to firms 
of ARV 
treatment 
R4,800 R13,131 R20,016 
Net savings 
(for salaries 
of R25,000) 
R4,412 – R4,800 =  
–R388   
(R4,024) 
R12,071 – R13,131= 
–R1,060 
(R11,011) 
R18,400 – R20,016=  
–R1,616 
(R16,784) 
Net savings 
(for salaries 
of R50,000) 
R8,433 – R4 ,800 = 
R3,633 
(R12,066)  
R23,070 – R13,131= 
R9,939 
(R33,009) 
R35,166 – R20,016= 
R15,150 
(R50,316) 
Net savings 
(for salaries 
of R100,000) 
R16,475 – R4,800= 
R11,675 
(R28,150) 
R45,067 – R13,131= 
R31,936 
(R77,003) 
R68,697 – R20,016= 
R48,681 
(R117,378) 
Sources: Calculated from data in Rosen et al (2000) and Regenberg (2001); assuming 
a discount rate of 10%.  The figures in parentheses include an estimate for 
productivity losses (i.e. indirect costs) which doubles the savings shown in Table 3. 
 
 
In addition to providing ARVs, firms may opt for other strategies to reduce 
their exposure to AIDS.  As Abt Associates observe:   
 
‘Firms may substitute capital for labour, allowing them to 
‘shed’ a proportion of labour due to HIV-AIDS without 
substantial productivity loss.  Some sectors and businesses 
may also substitute more plentiful (unskilled) labour for less 
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plentiful (skilled) labour, enabling them to replace lost/sick 
workers more easily.  Other potential strategies may include 
selectively hiring people who are likely to be at lower risk for 
key positions.’ (2000: 46). 
 
Although shifting towards more labour-intensive strategies (in order to take 
advantage of South Africa’s large pool of unemployed unskilled labour) is a 
possible strategy, this is unlikely to be widespread.  Firstly, such firms 
expose themselves to the disruptive impact of high turnover and absenteeism 
– costs which could easily swamp the ‘benefits’ of being able to replace sick 
workers.  Secondly, as ARVs become cheaper and more widely available 
through medical aid packages, firms are more likely to opt for a strategy that 
extends the lives of their workers - and especially their skilled workers.  
In addition to reacting to the risks associated with HIV infection in their 
workforce, firms will also react to AIDS-related changes in the demand for 
their products.  In a recent publication by J.P. Morgan (2001) entitled How to 
AIDS-Proof Your Consumer Portfolio, investors are advised to avoid 
companies whose consumers are relatively young and relatively poor – or 
whose products are luxury goods with a high income-elasticity of demand 
(because these companies could suffer as expenditure is reallocated towards 
health spending) or who rely on consumer purchases on credit (as defaults 
are likely to become more common15).  This kind of market advice is likely 
to depress stock prices for such firms and industries - thus sending a signal to 
entrepreneurs to diversify and gradually shift out of such markets.  In this 
way, firms will be better able to better protect their profit margins than is 
typically assumed by static analyses of the overall economic impact of 
AIDS. 
 
 
Recent Student Research on the Impact of 
AIDS on Firms 
 
Case studies involving the impact of AIDS on firms can help improve our 
understanding of the way that firms react.  However, given the wide range of 
possible reactions (and the likelihood that responses will vary according to 
economic sector), a substantive body of case-study research is required 
                                                          
15 MetAM is reported in the Business Day, 17 Jan 2002 as follows:  ‘People will have 
less disposable income due to rising medical and insurance costs.  Consumers will 
pose an increased credit risk to retailers… With credit retailers expected to be more 
affected, our retail stockpicking has been favouring those companies that target the 
upper section of the market where credit risk is lower’. 
 
 19
before even tentative conclusions can be reached about economy-wide 
reactions.  Fortunately, this is beginning to take place.  The Anglo-American 
Chairman’s fund has recently provided scholarships to graduate students at 
the University of Cape Town to support such case-study investigations 
through the AIDS and Society Research Unit (ASRU).  This research, whilst 
inevitably being uneven in quality, has pointed to some very interesting 
aspects of the economic impact of AIDS.  
Firstly, firms may not be using even the most basic information from 
their records to estimate the impact of AIDS.  Models, such as that 
developed in Table 4 above, assume that firms:  a) know basic information 
such as the number of days’ sick leave lost due to AIDS; b) are able to 
calculate the cost of the lost time (in terms of lost wages, the costs of training 
replacements, etc.); and c) are able to estimate the impact on their financial 
bottom line.  In reality, it would appear, firms either have not collected or 
used existing information; and where they have collected it, they have not 
used it to the full in estimating the economic impact.  Alan Whiteside of the 
Health Economics Research Department (HEARD) reports that this is 
common amongst South African firms he has dealt with.16      
In her study of one of the largest food manufacturers in Zimbabwe, 
Sanders (2001) found that the firm not only had no idea about HIV 
prevalence, but did not even have any readily available information on 
employment trends or on ‘sick’ days lost.  This basic information was 
available in the company archive (on paper and not on computer), but no one 
had pulled the data together in order to examine the trend across time.  It was 
thus unsurprising that the company employees and managers she interviewed 
had only a gut-feel notion of the impact of AIDS on the company.  The firm 
did, however, have an indication of the number of deaths that were either 
confirmed as, or suspected of being, AIDS-related (as evaluated by the 
company nurse).  Over the previous ten years, Sanders found that 2% of 
employees died each year and that, on average, 74% were AIDS-related 
deaths.  The company management complained about the cost of funerals 
(which Sanders estimated amounted to 2.3 times the monthly salary of the 
average worker) but otherwise had a limited understanding of the broader 
impact of AIDS on the enterprise.  This is surprising because the company 
had an AIDS prevention programme and compiled a monthly health services 
report.   
Kennedy (2001) encountered a similar problem in her study of a South 
African colliery.  The colliery was in the process of digitalising its records 
and was not yet in a position to provide her (or themselves) with trend data 
on days lost due to sick leave, compassionate leave and absenteeism (2001: 
8-9).  The colliery had recently started compiling data on the different causes 
                                                          
16 Personal communication.  
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of turnover, but had decided it ‘was not worth it’ to retrieve the data pre-
1998 in order to see the trend over time.  Rather than engage in a colliery-
specific analysis of the possible impact of AIDS, the holding company had 
commissioned an economic impact study.  Kennedy was highly critical of 
this study as it relied on demographic projections rather than colliery-level 
data, showed no understanding of the possible impact of AIDS on the 
production process,  and failed to account for costs such as severance pay, 
the salaries of medical personnel etc. (2001: 5-8).   
Byrne’s (2001) examination of a major cement producer in South Africa 
revealed a far greater awareness of the importance of collecting AIDS data 
on the part of management.  The firm had not only instituted a major AIDS 
awareness programme, but had gone so far to as test for HIV prevalence in 
two sites.  AIDS-related health data is collected at all sites and sent to the 
national head office.  But while the firm had a good idea of HIV prevalence 
and showed an extraordinarily positive approach to collecting relevant data, 
no systematic economic impact analysis appeared to have been done with the 
data.         
Secondly, the case studies reveal that direct (quantifiable) costs of 
HIV/AIDS comprise less than 5% of the wage bill – which is broadly in line 
with the case study research from Abidjan (Avetin and Huard (2000)).  Part 
of the reason for the relatively low estimate of direct impact was the lack of 
provision of pension and medical benefits to all workers.  This is in line with 
the results of the KwaZulu sugar mill study and the survey of firms in 
Bloemfontein and Welkon (discussed above).  It reflects the fact that most 
HIV+ workers are concentrated in the lower skill bands,17 which do not 
enjoy the same level of benefit provision as skilled and managerial 
employees.  
Thirdly, firms have only the vaguest sense of indirect costs – i.e. those 
‘difficult to quantify costs’ which impact on productivity, efficiency, morale 
etc..   This is partly because of the inherent difficulty involved in estimating 
such costs - and because it is almost impossible to be certain what trends can 
and cannot be attributed to AIDS.  Researchers have to be very careful of the 
post hoc ergo procter hoc fallacy: just because a firm shifts towards greater 
capital-intensity this does not mean that it was because of AIDS-related 
problems with labour supply.  Kennedy suggests that this may be the case 
with regard to the coal mining industry.  She argues that the colliery was 
engaged in a deliberate and long-standing strategy of mechanisation and 
                                                          
17 Byrne (2001: 7) found in the cement plant which had undertaken the voluntary 
saliva seroprevalence test amongst its employees, that 79% of HIV+ individuals were 
in the lower (predominantly unskilled) job bands.  Sanders (2001: 16) reported that 
deaths in the Zimbabwe food manufacturing firm were all amongst the least skilled 
job categories.  
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downsizing which was independent of the impact of AIDS.  According to a 
manager she interviewed ‘AIDS is not actually a problem, in fact it is 
helping us (downsize the workforce)’ (quoted in 2001: 20).    
Fourthly, employees who are HIV+ may choose not to remain with the 
firm - and hence may leave before the economic costs to the firm resulting 
from ill-health and absenteeism become serious.  Sanders, for example, 
found the puzzling result that AIDS-related deaths had fallen in recent years 
whilst ‘sick’ days lost had increased – at a time when the epidemic was 
approaching its peak in Zimbabwe.  One possible explanation (which was 
not explored) was that employees were leaving when they became sick and 
did not remain employed until death.  Kennedy found concrete evidence for 
this possibility at the colliery.  She quotes the nurse in charge of pre-test 
counselling and AIDS-testing as saying that most of those who test positive 
leave immediately because they ‘cannot handle the news, they just get up 
and run away’ (2001: 10). 
Fifthly, the colliery study illustrates the importance of detailed case study 
research ‘at the coal face’.  She reports a supervisor as complaining that 
senior management has its ‘head in the sand’ about the impact of HIV on the 
morale, output, and safety of his production teams (2001: 22).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
What does the discussion so far suggest about the impact of AIDS on 
distribution in South Africa?  The data and information is sketchy and 
uneven, and macroeconomic and firm-level modelling research work is 
highly dependent on theoretical and other assumptions.  Nevertheless, some 
worrying themes suggest themselves.  If firms react by continuing to 
decrease their reliance on unskilled labour (a trend that started before the 
AIDS pandemic) and by moving out of economic sectors whose customer-
base comprises lower-income consumers, then poor households will find 
themselves doubly disadvantaged.  Not only will their access to the labour 
market become ever more tenuous, but the products that they purchase may 
become scarcer (and more costly).   
Conversely, relatively skilled workers could benefit from greater 
employment opportunities (as production becomes more skill- and capital-
intensive) and higher wages (as the relative demand for skilled labour 
increases).  They will probably also live longer and more productive lives as 
firms begin to provide them with greater access to ARV medication.  The 
size of the pie may shrink as a result of AIDS, but employed (especially 
skilled) workers will enjoy a growing share.   
South Africa is increasingly divided along class lines with the gap 
between the employed and unemployed being of major importance (Nattrass 
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and Seekings, 2001).  The horrifying element that AIDS brings to the picture 
is that the divide will mean the difference between life and death for many 
people.  Those without access to jobs (especially good jobs) will bear the 
brunt of the AIDS pandemic.  Whether inequality is lower or higher twenty 
years from now is a moot point.  But over the next couple of decades, 
inequality will probably rise as AIDS lowers growth and slices its way 
through the poor and disadvantaged in South Africa. 
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